The ID debate (I)
A while ago now, I wrote a piece discussing the theory of “Intelligent Design”, which suggests that we can find scientific evidence supporting the idea that evolution is insufficient to explain the diversity of living things, and that we must instead posit an external force (usually understood as God) intervening. Although I have various problem with this (in the science not least), I was there concerned primarily with the theological implications of ID – most particularly with my concern that, in trying to incorporate aspects of both evolution and theistic creation, ID was becoming dualist in its approach.
A friend passed my article on to Peter Williams, a philosopher and apologist. He was kind enough to engage me in a short debate on the subject by email, during the course of which we discussed certain themes that are often obscured. Peter has given his permission for me to reproduce our emails here, and I’ll post them individually over the next few days. First, then, Peter’s initial response to my first post.
Peter wrote:
From my perspective I would simply say that the author of this piece fundamentally misunderstands the claims made by ID, and that it by no means has any of the dualistic implications implied. The necessary distinction is between design that is empirically detectable by given criteria and design that is not thus detectable.
Saying that something does not justify a design inference by a given criteria (e.g. specified complexity) is not the same as saying that it is not designed (epistemologically, it may or may not be). With a truck load of leaves I may deliberately strew them about the ground in the same way that the wind might, and the result would be designed, but would not justify a design inference; or I could use the leaves to make a picture or to spell out a poem, and the result would justify a design inference. Saying that the latter pattern justifies a design inference does not mean saying that the former pattern is not the result of design, only that the pattern itself gives no empirical grounds for saying so. Nevertheless, one might have alternative rational grounds for holding that the apparently random pattern of leaves is in fact the result of design – for example if the artist revealed this fact to you in person.
Hence – even if we interpret ID within a theistic framework which is not part and parcel of the theory as a scientific hypothesis – we do not end up dividing nature into a dualism of ‘designed’ and ‘not designed’, but rather into different modes of divine causation. I completely agree with the point about God’s sustaining activity and the compatibility of this metaphysical belief with scientific explanations in terms of natural processes.
Peter
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