The ID debate (III)

(Following on from The ID debate I and II, here is Peter’s second contribution.)

I took you to be saying that ID divided nature into designed and not designed, which is the same critique as given by Denis Alexander. I argued that it does not necessarily do this. My point was simply that ‘if we interpret ID within a theistic framework which is not part and parcel of the theory as a scientific hypothesis – we do not end up dividing nature into a dualism of ‘designed’ and ‘not designed’, but rather into different modes of divine causation.’ These modes may be ‘creating and sustaining’ (primary causaation) certain physical laws which together result in certain outcomes (perhaps through an evolutionary process) that may or may not all be intended by God (secondary causation) on the one hand, and deliberate primary causal activity on the other. To say that something in nature (a law, a structure, an event) does not trigger a design inference because it does not exhibit specified complexity, for example, is not to force the theologian to say that it is not sustained in existence by God, or that God
did not create it, or that God did not intend it.

From a purely scientific viewpoint, if we have a design detector it is a positive test and not a negative test. We can say x (a radio signal, a series of numbers, a chipped bit of flint, whatever) is designed, but we can’t say y is not designed. Y may or may not be designed. Y may be designed in such a way that does not trigger our design detector, but it may not be designed. As far as the design detection criteria developed by Dembski and Behe are concerned, an apparently random distribution of leaves on your lawn may be just that, or I may have placed each one exactly where it is with great care. However, a distribution of leaves that formed a portrait of the Queen or a poem by Blake would signal intelligent design. So here we have two lawns, one with leaves signalling ID and one with leaves not signalling ID. Do we end up dividing the lawns into a dualism of ‘designed’ and ‘not designed’? No. We say one is detectably designed and the other is not. This means that the other lawn may or may not be designed.

Note that detecting design does not tie down the metaphysical nature of the designer. ID does not therefore require reference to supernatural causes. I happen to think that philosophically a supernatural interpretation makes good sense, but this is not part of the scientific theory.

From a theological view point, this means that one could say that everything is designed, or not. Personally, I do not think that God directly controls everything. Now, some theistic evolutionists, such as Denis Alexander, do seem to think this, and thinking this seems compatible with ID; but you apparently don’t believe in a such a ‘puppet’ universe, and neither do I (cf. my reference to Jesus talking about the autonomy of plant growth in my article written in response to Dr Alexander’s critique of ID).

This does of course leave me with detectable examples of intelligent design to explain. Now, a naturalist might accept examples of design like irreducibly complex molecular machines and chalk them up to intelligent design by aliens (cf. Francis Crick’s ‘directed panspermia’ theory), or to time travellers (intelligent design is not necessarily divine design – indeed, it is not necessarily supernatural design, unless one is some kind of mind-body dualist and agrees that the cause of this e-mail is in that
sense supernatural); but I think the best explanation here is clearly the primary causal activity of a supernatural creator; who, as a Christian, I happen to think is God (rather than Plato’s demiurge for example).

Of course, none of this pre-determines or assumes any particular understanding of the biblical creation accounts. In point of fact I am neither an young nor an old earth ‘creationist’.

However, it bears repeating that as a scientific theory all ID claims is that:
a) we have one or more reliable criteria for making positive inferences to intelligent design
b) one or more features of the world pass those criteria and that therefore one or more features of the world are best explained as being the result of intelligent design

Since this forms a logically valid syllogism, I would simply ask whether you are denying the truth of the premise that we have reliable design detection criteria, or the truth of the premise that something in nature signals design according to reliable design detection criteria, or both?

The question of how that detected design is implimented is open to debate, and what philosophers and theologians care to make of this theory is just as much another kettle of fish as what they care to make of other scientific theories, such as the big bang or evolution.

Yours,

Peter S. Williams

Article posted at 10:26pm on 18 April 2006
Category: Faith, Musing, Science